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bstract: The exigencies of intergene-
rational and of international justice
seem to conflict. This paper discusses
this problem and develops a solution to it. After
criticising several alternative justifications from
the literature, a fully universalistic (i.e. uni-
versalistic in the temporal as well as spatial
 dimension) prioritarian welfare-ethic is deve-
lop ed and justified on the basis of our sympa-
thy: first a criterion of moral value is proposed,
followed by a conception of moral duties, which
relies on socially binding norms and requires to
strive for moral eﬃciency (most moral value for
a given eﬀort). Finally, these ideas are applied
to determining priorities between several big
social agendas. It turns out that, in practice,
dimensional conflicts are less prevalent than
 ini tially thought.
Tasks and duties of intergenerational justice
seem to conflict with those of international
justice. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions
in order to maintain a stable climate system
seems to require a restriction on economic
growth in emerging, and, to a lesser extent,
even in developing countries; reducing
 public debt for the sake of not financially
burdening the next generation seems to re-
quire cuts in social spending and investment
programmes for reducing unemployment
etc. Not surprisingly, such conflicts arise in
politics because of scarce financial resources.
Surprisingly, however, conflicts between the
temporal and spatial dimensions of justice,
as a consequence of diﬀerent justifications
for extending justice in these dimensions,
also exist in philosophical theories of justice.
In this paper these conflicts are discussed
from an ethical point of view. A theoretical
solution of how to resolve them is developed
and applied for the purpose of individuating
concrete optimum measures and strategies
for several open conflicts.
In the first section, philosophical justifi-
cations for universalising the domain of
 justice as well as conceptions of the inter -
relation between temporal and spatial justice
are discussed. In the second section a
 welfare-ethical, in particular prioritarian
 criterion of moral value which is universal
10
in the temporal as well as spatial dimension
will be developed and justified. In addition,
a conception of what we should do to realise
the moral values (in particular, which
 obligations we have) is developed. In light
of the scarcity of moral resources, namely
scarcity of moral motivation, a crucial
 condition for determining our moral
 commitments is moral eﬃciency, i.e. to
 realise maximal moral desirability for a given
level of eﬀort. In the third section, this
 conception is applied to the choices we have
with respect to the trade-oﬀs between
 intergenerational and international justice.
Some of the possible and already on-going
projects of moral engagement are deemed to
be particularly eﬃcient because they are
 capable of achieving more intergenerational
and international justice simultaneously.
I. Dimensions of universality in morals
and some universalistic ethics
If one speaks of “universality” or “universa-
lism” in ethics, this most commonly refers
to the extension of beneficiaries, i.e. the set
of beings who are protected and count as ob-
jects of concern for morals. This kind of uni-
versality will be henceforth referred to
throughout this paper as “beneficiary uni-
versality”. There are (mainly) three dimen -
sions in which the set of beneficiaries can be
delimited: 1. the spatial dimension: whether
people of only our country or of all nations
count as the objects of moral concern; 2. the
temporal dimension: whether people belong-
 ing to the currently dominant generation, all
currently living persons, or beings of all
 generations morally count; and 3. the onto-
logical dimension: which kind of beings are
moral beneficiaries: humans, sentient
beings, animals or living beings etc.? This
paper deals with the spatial and the tem poral
dimension only. Once being included in the
set of beneficiaries, beings may be consider ed
an object of moral concern to a full or  partial
degree; in particular, people living in distant
countries or in the distant future may be in-
cluded among the beneficiaries but given
less weight. In this paper, only morals that
give equal weight to all its beneficiaries will
be considered. Universality in both the tem-
poral and the spatial dimension will be hen-
ceforth called “full universality”.
There are ethics which are universal in
one dimension only, such as John Rawls’
theory of justice, which is beneficiary uni-
versalistic in the temporal dimension but na-
tionalistic in the spatial dimension.
Although several theoreticians find this in-
coherent, in the strict sense it is not. There-
fore justifying full beneficiary universalism
requires justifying universalism in both di-
mensions. The most ambitious attempt in
this direction is probably Thomas Nagel’s
(1970) argument, which has been adopted
by other philosophers such as Parfit and
Broome. The basic idea of his justification is
this: persons ontologically consist of person–
time slices: me now, me in ten years, you to-
morrow, my son in twenty years, the not yet
born eldest grandchild of Julio Alexander
(from Guatemala) in 80 years etc. Now it is
a universally accepted request of rationality
to care for one’s later selves, and to give them
all the same weight too. However, according
to the ontological premise, I will be as sepa-
rated from myself in ten years as you to-
morrow are separated from yourself today
and from me today, so the rationality require -
ment extends to all person – time slices.
Thus the rational request of caring for
 person – time slices diﬀerent from me today
extends to all person – time slices, and, in
turn, becomes a way of reaching full bene -
ficiary universalism.
This nice and seemingly strong justifica-
tion of full beneficiary universalism, how -
ever, contains several fallacies. Although it is
theoretically unproblematic to consider a
person to be composed of time slices, from
a biological as well as from a psychological
and, in particular, from a motivational per-
spective, there is a natural continuity
 between succeeding time slices of the same
person, whereas between diﬀerent persons a
clear discontinuity exists. For example, if
one of my fingers is cut oﬀ today, I will be
missing my finger in all my future time-
 slices. Moreover, my hedonic desires not to
suﬀer but to be happy are timeless (I wish
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this today, tomorrow and whenever) and
refer to me (or to any of my future selves).
Only because of these desires does the
 rational requirement to consider our further
future as well as our present selves have a
motivational basis that makes it acceptable
and achievable; and because we often over-
look how our desires in the (sometimes dis -
tant) future will be aﬀected by some action
in the present, to keep the rational require-
ment in mind makes pragmatic sense.
The inverse route of justification – i.e. there
is an a priori intelligible requirement to care
about all person – time slices diﬀerent from
me now, which then, in a way which is not
clear, generates the rational desire to do
 exactly this – is neither based on a justified
principle, since there simply is no valid a
priori justification for this rationality
 require ment, and without such a justifica-
tion its content appears to be arbitrary and
ad hoc, nor can this route generate the desire
and motivation out of nothing.
A lesson to be learned from the failure
of Nagel’s master argument for full benefi-
ciary universalism is that the necessary mo-
tivating justification of morals cannot rely
on a priori reasons; it must instead rest on
real rational motives or desires. Peter Singer’s
ethics is currently the most prominent
 defence of full beneficiary universalism, and it
is based on rational motives. Singer develops
a two-piece strategy of justification, in which
the first part justifies a fully universal utili-
tarian criterion of morality,1 and the second
part provides reasons why to follow it in
one’s practice. The second part says the fol-
lowing: to use the utilitarian principles not
only in one’s speech, but also to act on them,
is a question of coherence, with the conse-
quence of avoiding uncomfortable hypo-
crisy;2 furthermore, egoism leads to the
paradox of hedonism: the egoist is altogeth er
less happy than the altruist.3 The latter
 argument is then further strengthened by
positive considerations: acting for a self-
transcendent cause like the perspective of
the universe provides sense to one’s life.4This
line of thought had already been further ela-
borated by Ernest Partridge: we should iden-
tify with and promote self-transcendent (in
particular future-related) causes in order to
cultivate a rich personality and for the sake
of leaving a work which survives us, even for
our own consolation.5
This justification leaves open critical
questions. The fact that Singer and
 Partridge, who hold diﬀerent views in nor-
mative  ethics,6 basically advance the same ar-
gument for acting morally, nicely shows that
the personally positive eﬀects of devoting
much of one’s resources to a self-transcen-
dent cause do not depend strongly on the
content of that cause. In particular, this im-
plies that the question of how far and in
which dimension to extend the set of moral
beneficiaries cannot be determined via this
route. To give sense to one’s life is an im-
portant reason and motivation for a strong
and active commitment to morals; and good
morals, like the ones that will be developed
here, should use this resource; but to find
sense in this way depends on a prior moti-
vating justification and adoption of some
personal morals. One lesson to be learnt
from this situation is that Singer’s structu-
ral layout (providing two  justifications) is
very strong and should be maintained.
 How ever, the systematically primary
 justification of the moral criteria has to rely
on already motivating reasons to adopt
 exactly these criteria as one’s personal morals. 
II. Justifying a fully universalistic 
prioritarianism
In criteriological or normative ethics, the
currently most prominent and in each case
possibly fully universalistic ethic is the group
of welfare ethics. These are ethics which de-
fine the moral value of an action exclusively
in terms of the welfare, utility or desirability
brought about by this action for the persons
or sentient beings aﬀected by it. The various
individual or personal desirabilities are ag-
gregated in some way to one measure of
moral value of this action. The diﬀerent
types of welfare ethics diﬀer mainly in how
this aggregation is undertaken. Utilitarian -
ism simply adds up the individual utilities.
Moderate welfare egalitarianism first calcula-
tes this sum too but then subtracts from it a
measure of unequal utility distribution; the
higher the inequality, the greater the sub-
traction. Prioritarianism gives desirability
changes for people who are generally worse
oﬀ a greater weight; the worse oﬀ people are,
the greater the weighting. 
Due to the fact that in welfare-ethical
criteria of moral value the wellbeing or util -
ity of beings is the only relevant indepen-
dent variable,7 irrespective of spatial or
temporal distance, these ethics are in principle
fully universalistic. In addition, they are
clear and able to include in their considera-
tions everything which is of value and to
 balance it against all the other aspects.
 Therefore, welfare ethics are optimally apt
for operationalising full universalism, and,
as such, the remainder of this essay will
 proceed on the basis that they constitute the
right general approach.
However, it is always possible to limit
the fully universalistic approach of welfare
ethics by adding boundary principles or dis-
counting factors. In addition, as just explained,
there is a plurality of welfare ethics which
imply diﬀerent preferences with  regard to
various important questions. So, even if we
accept a general welfarist approach in
 normative ethics, we still have to decide
which particular approach to adopt,  whether
perhaps to limit its universalism and why to
accept this particular approach in the first
place. Such a decision can only be rationally
arrived at with the help of an approach to
justifying ethics.
The discussion in the first section, in
which various attempts to justify univer -
salis tic morals were described, has taught us
several lessons. R(equirement)1: motivating
justification: The prospected justification
may neither be intuitionistic (since this is
not a justification at all; intuitions are  un -
reli able etc.) nor a priori (because mere a
priori considerations cannot provide moti-
vating reasons to adopt and follow moral cri-
teria); it should instead consist of listing
motivating reasons to adopt and follow these
morals. This implies that the content of such
motivating reasons will also shape morals’
content. R2: motivational amplifiers: The
 justification should be twofold. Firstly, the
moral criterion has to be justified by moti-
vating reasons in such a way that wise moral
subjects adopt it and therefore are inclined,
to some degree, to follow it. Secondly,
 further motivating reasons should then be
provided and institutions designed which
strengthen the motivation to follow the mo-
rals (justified in the first step) to a degree
that one actually does so in practice. The
first step provides the moral "signal" so to
speak, the second step "amplifies" it.
However, these specifications are not yet
suﬃcient and selective enough to get the
 justification of morals started. The conside-
rations undertaken so far (R1 and R2) relate
only to formal aspects. Considerations re-
garding the specific idea, value, aim and
function of morals are missing and have to
be discussed and fixed. Unfortunately, the
“The necessary motivating 
justification of morals cannot rely on
a priori reasons; it must instead rest
on real rational motives or desires.”
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ethical discussion regarding this part of mo-
rals is underdeveloped; therefore, the
 following considerations are much more
speculative than what has been developed so
far. So what, according to this speculation, is
the idea, the aim, and function of morals?
In order to provide an answer to this
 question, two functionally rather distinct
morals have to be distinguished: there are in-
dividual, private morals, which can be followed
by their respective subject individually, and
there are social morals, which are institutio-
nalised, in particular by social norms. Social
morals are binding for everyone and enfor-
ced by threats of social sanctions. The aim
of individual morals may be to realise one’s
sympathetic and respect inclinations (i.e.
 natural altruistic inclinations with a content
near to morals) in a systematic and
 organised way. The function of socially
 binding morals, on the other hand, could be
a kind of prudential consensualism: R3: The
aim of socially binding morals is, first, to
provide an interpersonally uniform and
 binding value order for a society, i.e. a com-
plete social desirability function, namely the
moral desirability function, which, second,
is the basis for deciding about conflicts of
 interests in a binding and socially accepted
form, hence has a peace-making function,
and which, third, is the basis for determin -
ing projects of social cooperation, to be
 realised collectively.8 According to the mo-
tivation requirement (R1), the moral desira-
bility function must be motivational and,
according to prudential consensualism (R3),
it must also be consensual, i.e. equal for all
subjects of the moral system; this can be
 called "subject universalism". (Subject uni-
versalism says that all the subjects of a moral
system have the same moral value function;
beneficiary universalism says that the realm
of objects who benefit from the moral
 system is universal.) A motivating form of
subject universalism is attainable only if the
moral desirability function is (more or less)
identical to or follows from the subject uni-
versal parts of the moral subjects’ prudential
(i.e. rational plus stable) individual desirabi-
lity functions. In other words, to identify the
moral value function, we have to look for
those parts of the moral subjects’ prudential
desirability functions which are subject uni-
versal, i.e. (more or less) identical in all
moral subjects. There are only very few com-
ponents of our individual desirability func -
tions which fulfil this condition; the most
important is a certain expected sympathy,
i.e. the expected desirability of having, as a
consequence of some measure to be evalua-
ted, sympathetic feelings for beings one is
not personally acquainted with; the respec-
tive desire or motive to produce more desi-
rable sympathetic feelings may be called
“sympathy optimising”. For example, for Amy
and Bud, Carl eating a nutritious meal may
in one respect have the same expected pru-
dential desirability, namely in the respect
that this perhaps will make Amy and Bud
have the same amount of sympathetic feel -
ings for Carl, i.e. enjoying Carl’s moment of
well-being. For open-minded subjects
 (prudence requires open-mindedness), the
sympathetic feelings for beings one is not
personally acquainted with are not restricted
to certain groups of persons, like the citizens
of one’s community or state; hence,  sym -
pathy tends to be beneficiary universal. If
our sympathetic feelings were proportional
to the beneficiary’s well-being, the desirability
function of expected sympathy would be
utilitarian – and this may be what moral
sentimentalists defending or tending
 towards utilitarianism (like David Hume or
Adam Smith) had in mind. However, our
sympathetic feelings are not proportional to
the beneficiary’s well-being; negative sympa-
thy, pity, is stronger than positive sympathy,
i.e. joy about the other’s pleasure and good
condition. As a consequence, the desirability
function of expected sympathy is not pro-
portional to the beneficiary’s well-being but
convex: further increases in well-being (over
life-time) lead to, taken together, more
 desirable sympathetic feelings, but the in-
crement becomes smaller and smaller. And
this means that the moral desirability
function resulting from its equation with the
desirability function of expected sympathy
is prioritarian, giving the more weight to im-
provements the worse oﬀ the beneficiaries
are.9
So subject universalism does not analy-
tically imply beneficiary universalism; but
the empirically individuated subject univer-
sal desirability function of sympathy opti-
mising tends to be beneficiary universal too.
Why should we not curb this tendency
 within certain limits? To be more precise, the
question is not whether many or the vast ma-
jority of our socially binding or of our per-
sonal moral projects should not serve the
persons next to us (probably in fact they
should do so), or why we should devote
equal care to all persons (this would be ab-
surd); the question instead is whether the
range of beneficiaries should be limited in
principle, i.e. before deciding on single pro-
jects. The main reason for not limiting the
range of beneficiaries is again the universal -
istic character of the source of these morals:
if we are confronted with the misery of a
being beyond the artificially introduced
 limits, e.g. of national borders, and hence
beyond our active concern, sympathy will
emerge nonetheless (if it is not blocked by
defence mechanisms), thereby rendering our
active but curbed sympathy optimising void.
However, we may nonetheless be temp-
ted to curb the range of beneficiaries (e.g. to
save costs), accepting the resulting sympa-
thy costs associated with the relatively rare
interactions with the sentient beings beyond
our oﬃcial beneficence. There are further
reasons why morals should not be limited in
this way. In the spatial dimension one finds
the nationalist limits on socially binding
morals undermine the peacemaking
function of morals at the international level;
and instead of increasing forces by global co-
operation, they lead to the coexistence of va-
rious, taken together, often incompatible
and hence mutually obstructive projects of
diﬀerent national communities. For exam-
ple, country A’s project is economic growth,
for which it needs the estates of country B as
well as its raw materials and markets; coun-
try B’s project is economic development, for
which it is best to prohibit the ceding of its
estates and to strictly regulate the export of
its raw materials as well as the import of
mass and luxury products; the result will
probably be a trade war between country A
and B. Worse outcomes are also possible. 
In the temporal dimension, a direct war
“For defining 'moral value', we have
to look for those parts of the moral
subjects’ prudential desirability
functions which are subject
 universal… there are only very few
 com ponents of our individual
 desirability functions which fulfil
this condition; the most important is
a certain  expected sympathy.”
“The question is not whether many
or the vast majority of our socially
binding or of our personal moral
 projects should not serve the persons
next to us… or why we should 
devote equal care to all  persons …;
the  question instead is whether the
range of beneficiaries should be
 limited in principle.”
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between generations who are not living at
least to some extent simultaneously is im-
possible. However, a sort of revolving strife
between, on the one hand, the presently do-
minant middle generation and, on the other,
the young and the old generation is clearly
possible and, perhaps to some degree, a
 reality. To strictly confine the range of bene-
ficiaries, however, is more diﬃcult in the
temporal dimension than in the spatial di-
mension because of the permanent change
of each possible in-group and out-group, the
permanent change of possible coalition part-
ners, and because of the strategically disad-
vantageous position any such strictly
confined group of moral subjects and bene-
ficiaries will end up in – though several ger -
ontocracies show that rather strict temporal
confinement, the strategic disadvantage not-
withstanding, is possible in cases where the
successor generation is confident to inherit
all the privileges of the currently dominant
generation. In any case, the listed diﬃculties
make moral systems with strictly confined
temporal limitations on the sets of benefi-
ciaries unstable. Most of the accomplish-
ments of present generations which are
valuable for future generations have not pri-
marily been intended to be so; they pay oﬀ
already for the present generation and are
valuable for future generations only via in-
heriting goods which are left over but still
useful. Nonetheless, in the temporal dimen-
sion too, far extending cooperation is possible,
namely intergenerational cooperation on
long-term projects, with the first cooperat ing
generation reaping only minor profits from
the project, whilst later generations are
 needed to complete it, and the whole pro-
ject’s value exceeds the value of comparable
one-generation projects – consider the cul-
tivation of land, the planting of woods, and
other very long-term infrastructural projects
(tunnel construction, new traﬃc routes etc.)
or, in former times, the building of cathe-
drals. This presupposes a temporally rather
far extended subject universality of the
 underlying social value function. Though it
may seem at first that present generations
can, for their own profit, easily and without
risk harm future generations (via environ-
mental degradation or resource depletion),
and that, from the temporally extended
 cooperation just described, these present ge-
nerations can only encounter disadvantages
or, at least, too little in the way of profit, at
second glance we may recognise that it is
also possible that future generations cancel
out the prior generation’s projects and hopes
– in particular if the projects were intended
to serve the prior generation’s memory (gra-
teful or admiring memory itself, physical
portraits or biographies, mausoleums, idio-
syncratic architecture or landscape or social
design) or if they were planned perhaps even
for future “beneficiaries” but without suﬃ-
cient subject universality (like much of Sta-
linist or fascist architecture, megalomaniac
nature destruction and “idiosyncratic” social
structures like stone age communism or the
Millennium Reich). For guaranteeing fruit-
ful intergenerational cooperation via socially
binding morals, a temporally universal
moral desirability function is needed. 
All this shows that the temporal subject
and beneficiary universality of socially binding
morals are normally better for realising the
function of such morals than temporally
 confined morals. Somewhat diﬀerent argu-
ments hold in favour of full universality of
 individual morals. Confining the reach of
 individual morals is also possible; and it is
probably viable to make life meaningful via
self-transcendent projects whose significance
is narrowly confined to one’s spatial and tem-
poral neighbourhood and which are not em-
bedded in universal projects. Why one’s
personal moral desirability function should
be fully universal is mainly a question of per-
sonal identity: if one does not want to be pro-
vincial (i.e. the significance of one’s projects
and life to be restricted to one’s neighbour-
hood, the object of one’s pride and identifi-
cation to have only vanishing meaning in a
universal context, and the “validity” of one’s
values restricted to a community of few per-
sons), then full beneficiary universality is the
best remedy. The same line of reasoning holds
indirectly for socially binding morals too: as
requirement R2 states, to be eﬀective, these
morals depend on amplifying motives such as
self-transcendence, feelings of self-worth etc.;
if the range of beneficiaries of socially binding
morals is too narrow, such morals are not apt
to be adopted as personal morals by subjects
with more cosmopolitan ideals; as a conse-
quence, these subjects will not adopt and su-
stain these morals; and if there is a significant
share of cosmopolitan subjects, limited moral
conceptions will fail as socially binding
 morals.
We have so far considered only the
moral desirability function, i.e. the evalua-
tive part of morals. Now we have to deal
with the normative or instructive part: what
shall we do? In axiological ethics (i.e. ethics
whose primary moral notion is the concept
of moral value, like welfare ethics), moral
 actions serve to realise moral values. How -
ever, we are not moral machines which are
programmed to always do the morally best;
this is simply impossible; and apart from
 acting morally, we want to have elbow room
for our private projects. Therefore, our
moral commitment, i.e. the time and
 resources we dedicate to morals, is limited
in principle – the right amount of moral
commitment is not of interest in the present
context. But if the sense of our moral actions
is, nonetheless, the realisation of moral
 values, then this aim is served better if more
moral value is realised, which under the con-
dition of limited resources leads to the re-
quest of personal moral eﬃciency: R4.1: the
resources the subject is prepared to dedicate
to morals should be invested eﬃciently, i.e.
where they produce maximal moral value.
This holds for personal morals, but analog -
ously it holds for socially binding morals
too. Socially binding morals do not confide
(entirely) in the subjects’ autonomous moti-
vation for moral action, but introduce
norms supported by the threat of social
sanctions to strengthen the motivation to act
morally; so these norms are again instru-
ments for realising moral values. However,
such socially binding norms – whether
 formal, i.e. legal, or informal norms – do not
fall from the sky; they have to be put
through by subjects with a particularly high
moral motivation, often via a long political
process and in the face of resistance, and
 afterwards they have to be maintained, at
least in part, by subjects with a special moral
motivation. Hence, there are strong limits to
the possibility of emergence of new socially
valid moral norms – limits produced by
 political resistance as well as the scarcity of
moral motivation among the subjects
 engaged in sustaining such norms. If the
function of socially binding moral norms is
“For guaranteeing fruitful
 intergenerational cooperation via
 socially  binding morals, a temporally
 universal moral desirability function
is  needed.”
“There are strong limits to the
 possibility of realising new socially
valid moral norms – limits produced
by political resistance as well as the
scarcity of moral motivation among
the subjects engaged in sustaining
such norms.”
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to realise moral values, this aim is served bet-
ter if more value is realised, which under the
condition of limited resources leads again to
a requirement of social moral eﬃciency: R4.2:
If new moral norms shall be implemented
or old norms reformed, those norms which
are politically and technically feasible, and
which altogether (i.e. including also surveil-
lance, punishments etc.) produce the highest
moral value, shall be realised.10 Eﬃciency re-
quirements will often lead to giving priority
to those projects that help people who are
close (in any respect: physically, mentally, so-
cially, etc.) to us, however, not necessarily
and certainly not always. Let us study this in
more detail.
III. Eﬃcient moral politics – 
international and intergenerational
With full universality of morals, for political
subjects like states or alliances of states a
huge variety of possible long- and short-term
interventions or projects to institutionalise
new norms or to reform old ones for moral
improvement, i.e. welfare increase, become
imaginable. Since not all projects can be
 realised, they compete with each other. In
particular, conflicts between present-day
 national, international and intergenerational
concerns (i.e. who will be the primary
 beneficiaries) are possible and should be ex-
pected. According to the theory developed
earlier, the presupposition for taking an
 option into consideration is whether it is
technically feasible and politically enforce-
able; and the criterion for deciding between the
remaining options is their moral  eﬃciency:
more eﬃcient projects shall be realised first.
“Moral eﬃciency”, more  precisely, is usually
conceived as the cost-welfare ratio, i.e. the
 resources invested for realising a given pro-
ject divided by the moral value produced by
it; the lower this ratio is (i.e. if the project is
relatively cheap), the higher is the project’s
eﬃciency.11 The usual units for measuring
resources of all kinds in a comparable and
uniform way are monetary units, e.g. US-
dollars (= USD). The units of moral value
are morally and quality adjusted life years, or
“(m)QALYs” for short: for calculating the
moral value of the life of a certain person,
first, the mean well-being of this person has
to be established (via many interviews or via
inferences from empirical results about the
usual well-being of persons in the same
 situation) and expressed in per cent of the
social mean well-being (so 50% or 0.5
means that the respective person is only half
as happy as the rest of the population);
14
 second, this personal mean is multiplied
with the person’s (expected) lifespan; the re-
sult is the personal value of this person’s life,
measured in QALYs – which is a measure of
the personal utility. Third, depending on the
moral criterion used, the personal utility has
to be translated into a moral value via a moral
value function; in the case of priorita rianism,
this is done via a concavely  increasing (i.e. less
and less increasing) weighting function; the
result is the moral value of the person’s life,
measured in prioritarian QALYs (= pQALYs).
Finally, for  determining the moral value of a
certain action, the moral value of the
 aﬀected person's life with that action is
 subtracted from the value it has without that
action. In the following, utilitarian cost-
 welfare ratios, where the welfare is measured
in terms of quality adjusted life years
(USD/QALY), as well as prioritarian cost-
welfare ratios, where welfare is measured in
priority weighted quality  adjusted life years
(USD/pQALY), will be provided. The  values
of USD/QALY and of USD/pQALY are not
directly comparable; only values of the same
measure can be compared, and then express
(inverse) relative preferability.
The following assessments are based on
some rough estimates I have developed in
other publications; they are not very exact,
but give an idea of the order of magnitude.
Mere present-day national actions, like
 reduction of public debts or income redis-
tribution (e.g. for social assistance or provi-
sion of basic health, programmes against
unemployment, in particular youth unem-
ployment, programmes for better education,
programmes for igniting economic growth
etc.), although, of course, immensely im-
portant, will not be discussed here because
the respective eﬃciency orders even among
OECD countries vary greatly due to diﬀer-
 ing circumstances. The following list of in-
ternational and intergenerational projects is
ordered roughly according to their moral ef-
ficiency, more eﬃcient projects are presen-
ted first.
1. Allowances against starvation, in particu-
lar in cases of endemic famines, restore the
hungry person’s original life expectancy with
the help of a relatively minor contribution
over a limited period; hence within a popu-
lation, such measures donate to its members,
on average, half the life expectancy at birth
of that population, e.g. 30-35 years. Accor-
ding to a very rough estimate, the eﬃciency
during the supply period alone is about 784
USD2010/QALY, or 395 USD2010/pQALY;12
this figure is still radically reduced if, after
some relatively short allowance period, a re-
turn to normal life is possible (e.g. if the ali-
mentation phase lasts one year in a region
with a life expectancy of 60 years, then the
just indicated amount would have to be
 divided by 30, thus reaching 26
USD2010/QALY and 13 USD2010/pQALY). If
measures of this sort are necessary and
 possible, they should be given top priority.
2. Creating a well-ordered state is to erect
a sovereign political and administrative pu-
blic power with an eﬀective and law-abiding
state machinery devoted to the citizens’ wel-
fare and which respects human rights and
the law of peoples and, at best, is liberal and
democratic too.13 Much of world poverty
and social disintegration is not simply a con-
sequence of so far insuﬃcient economic and
social development, but of missing or, even
worse, counteracting executive or other
power structures led by self-enriching re-
gimes or political castes, which for ensuring
their power tend to suppress political oppo-
sition or social minorities.14The overturning
of such regimes and the creation a well-or-
dered state – via measures ranging from in-
sightful reforms by enlightened leaders over
peaceful or violent revolutions by a compe-
tent opposition, to humanitarian interven-
tions – may liberate political, social and
economic potentials, which lead to fast de-
velopment. Foreigners can support such pro-
cesses in various ways, beginning with
materially helping and instructing the op-
position, providing retreat possibilities etc.
The last resort can be humanitarian inter-
vention, which does not only protect the
victims of crimes against humanity, but, at
best (especially if strong and competent op-
position forces are present), also overturns
an inhuman regime and initiates the
 progression towards a well-ordered state.
Although humanitarian interventions, like
wars in general, are tremendously expensive,
it is possible, under such conditions, that
they are morally quite eﬃcient due to their
long-term political, social and economic be-
nefits. (The Kosovo intervention, which did
not only protect and liberate the Kosovars,
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but also led to the fall of the nationalist
 Milosevic regime, is an example in kind.
 According to a rough calculation, the moral
eﬃciency of the immediate humanitarian
 eﬀects of this intervention – mostly by
 preventing genocide – was 9426 USD2010
/QALY or 9775 USD2010/pQALY.15 Adding
the moral value of the further political and
economic benefits (which are very hard to
estimate), i.e. the so-called peace dividend,
these values are further reduced consider -
ably. To avoid misunderstanding, it has to
be added that neither the Afghanistan nor
the second Iraq war were humanitarian in-
terventions; their moral values are debat able;
and, if they have a positive moral value, their
cost-welfare ratio will be tremendously
 higher than the ratio calculated for Kosovo.)
3. Development aid, at least when it is
well planned, goes beyond feeding the poor,
i.e. providing some sort of permanent social
assistance for increasing the income of the
poor somewhat above the absolute poverty
line – which, again according to a very
rough estimate, may cost 6106
USD2010/QALY or 4384 USD2010/pQALY;16
such social assistance is only a fallback posi-
tion for development aid. Good develop-
ment aid accomplishes a certain level of
economic and agricultural development,
mass and elite education, decent health and
life expectancy etc. together with the re-
spective infrastructures in such a way that
the country developed so far can guarantee
a minimum level of prosperity to all its citi-
zens and is no longer dependent on foreign
help. There are excellent development aid
projects which are highly eﬃcient, impres-
sively more eﬃcient than the values for so-
cial assistance just given – e.g. medical
assistance for visually impaired or handi-
 capped people, which in extreme cases
makes a blind person see for 40 USD, thus
reaching an eﬃciency of up to less than 2
USD2010/QALY, or projects of housing and
educating street children, or vaccination or
AIDS prevention projects. However, these
seem to be the cherries on the cake, whereas
the mass of developmental aid is much more
awkward, much less eﬃcient, and, in parts,
even detrimental, often as a consequence of
the problems touched upon under point 2,
or because exploitation is camouflaged as de-
velopment aid or help is given without feed-
back.17 Looking for eﬃciency whilst keeping
in mind the respective traps, the eﬃciency
of development aid should not lag far be-
hind that of creating a well-ordered state.
4. Fighting climate change and its conse-
quences is another big topic on the interna-
tional agenda. Anthropogenic climate
change has very few positive consequences
(like extending cultivable land towards the
poles in some regions of the world) but a
huge variety of massive negative impacts –
like extending malaria, increasing and ag-
gravating hot spells and hurricanes, the sub-
merging of  low islands by the sea, etc. The
worst eﬀects, however, will probably result
from the aridisation and desertification of
former cultivable land, which lead to the dis-
placement, migration and often pauperisa-
tion of the aﬀected population, to more
famines, increases in the price of food and
hence an enormous growth of the number
of the absolute poor. With “business as
usual” these eﬀects may lead to an additional
4 million casualties per year in the second
half of this century.18 The most important
countermeasure, reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, requires radical technical impro-
vements at considerable costs, which, howe-
ver, will, in any case, be inevitable one day.
A rough estimate says that sustainable
 reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to the
1990 level (with discounting future costs by
3% per year) may cost 10268
USD2010/QALY or 9380 USD2010/pQALY.19
The vast majority of victims of business as
usual will live in poor countries; and its
worst eﬀects will be brought about by
 aggravating the situation of the poor. Con-
versely, this means that development aid also
mitigates several bad eﬀects of climate
change and makes this aid still more
 eﬃcient.
In order to give an idea of the eﬃciency of
the programmes just discussed, these have to
be compared with measures undertaken in
rich countries. Some examples are: social
 assistance in the U.S., i.e. raising income of
people slightly below the poverty line, has a
cost-welfare relation of 53939 USD2010/
QALY or 51710 USD2010/pQALY;20 reduc -
ing taxes of the very rich (more than 1 million
USD annual income) or increasing top in-
vestment bankers’ bonuses has a cost-welfare
ratio of at least 10 million USD2010/(p)
QALY; mostly, however, this ratio (more
precisely: the limit of this ratio as the start -
ing income approaches 75000 USD2010/
year) is infinite (i.e. the beneficiary’s well-
being does not increase at all21) and some -
times negative (i.e. the beneficiary’s well-being
decreases via the usual disasters of greed).
The comparatively much higher eﬃcien -
cy of the international and intergenerational
projects discussed above (as compared to
 national present-day projects) is to a great
extent due to the fact that the beneficiaries
of these measures are, at least to a large ex-
tent, poor people in poor countries. This has
three eﬃciency increasing eﬀects: 1. because
of the lower income, the marginal utility of
income increases is higher; 2. purchasing
power of money from rich countries in these
countries is much higher than at home; 3.
prioritarianism attributes more moral value
to welfare increases for people who are worse
oﬀ. One question posed by this paper is
whether international and intergenerational
justices of beneficiary universality are in con-
flict with each other. From the great projects
discussed, only allowances against starvation
have beneficiaries outside the present-day
national range in only one dimension: the
spatial. The other three projects have bene-
ficiaries in both dimensions discussed here.
Their high eﬃciency originates to a large ex-
tent from the fact that at least an important
share of their beneficiaries are poor people
or badly oﬀ for other reasons and that the
measures have structural consequences with
long lasting beneficial eﬀects for future ge-
nerations. Therefore, according to this as-
sessment, within this group of measures the
possible conflict between the exigencies of
international and intergenerational justice is
nearly non-existent in practice.
Notes
1 Singer 2011: 87-124.
2 Singer 2011: 142-145.
3 Singer 2011: 145.
4 Singer 1993: ch. 10-11.
5 Partridge 1981.
6 While Singer is a utilitarian, Partridge in
his paper mainly defends a – not further
qualified – moral requirement to care about
the distant future (Partridge 1981: 204). In
addition, Partridge, who sees the problem
much more from a psychological point of
view, provides empirical evidence that self-
transcendence is important for everybody
but can be obtained by caring for various
concerns, including concrete others, even
patriotism or religious ideals (Partridge
1981: 208).
7 Welfare ethics define the moral value of
some state of aﬀairs p as a function (e.g. the
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sum) of all the personal utilities of that p for
the single sentient beings. So, for determin -
ing the moral value of p we need only to
know these personal utilities of p for the va-
rious individuals, but no other facts like the
time or place of living of the respective sub-
jects. Time and place of living can and do
influence the moral value – it usually makes
a diﬀerence in moral value if poor Julio Alex-
ander from Guatemala or (relatively) rich
Bill from the States receives 1000 USD left
over somewhere – but only indirectly via the
personal utilities of the persons aﬀected – in
the example, because Julio Alexander will
have a much higher utility from these 1000
USD than Bill – and not because the place
of living counts in itself for the welfare-ethi-
cal moral value. This is diﬀerent e.g. in na-
tionalist ethics, where belonging to a certain
nation in itself leads to giving more moral
weight to the respective person's fate.
8 Lumer 1999: section 3.
9 Lumer 2009: 589-632.
10 Lumer 2002: 93-95.
11 This way to measure eﬃciency is a bit
confusing because a higher value of the cost-
welfare relation (i.e. higher costs for the
same welfare) means lower eﬃciency. The
inverse relation, i.e. the welfare-cost relation,
fits better to the ordinary meaning of “eﬃ-
ciency” because a higher value of the welfare-
cost relation (i.e. more moral value for the
same investment) now means more eﬃ-
ciency. However, the substance does not
change; the same order of preferences is only
expressed in a diﬀerent way, and it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that lower cost-welfare
relations are more eﬃcient, hence prefer -
able.
12 Lumer 2002: 82. The prices given are pri-
ces of 1990; they are corrected here and in
the following according to the U.S. general
consumer price index: U.S. Census Bureau
(ed.): The 2012 Statistical Abstract. Last mo-
dified September 27, 2011. Table 725, p.
474. http://www.census.gov/compendia/sta-
tab/2012edition.html. Viewed 3 November
2011.
13 This definition goes beyond Rawls’s
(1999) introduction, since it stresses the
state’s eﬀectiveness, law-abidingness and
 devotion to the citizens’ welfare, which
 excludes self-enrichment, nepotism, corrup-
tion, and power vacuums as well as disorgan-
 isation.
14 Landes 1998.
15 Lumer 2009: 329-333; 338-340. The
1999 price given here has been corrected as
described in note 11. The USD/QALY
16
 values have been converted into
USD/pQALY values following the method
explained in Lumer 2002: 65-71.
16 Lumer 2002: 82.
17 Easterly 2006.
18 Lumer 2002: 26.
19 Lumer 2002: 81; prices adjusted as
 explained in note 11.
20 Lumer 2002: 82.
21 Kahneman / Deaton 2010.
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